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Abstract 
Accounting flexibility has raised concern about management opportunism among owners. 
Accounting discretion, as an information system controlled by directors, intensifies opportunism and 
agency problem. Regarding the firm situation, however, directors are likely to employ accounting 
discretion so that its consequences are compatible with shareholders’ interests, or at least do not 
oppose them. Firm size and growth opportunity are of great importance for its management, 
depending on the way it uses accounting discretion. The present study aims to offer a model 
indicating the relationship between firm size and growth opportunity and accounting discretion, and 
its effect on stock return as a distinctive characteristic of firm performance and consequently, test 
the management opportunism. This research employs an applied and correlational method. The 
results respectively point to a positively and negatively significant relationship between firm size 
and firm’s growth opportunity, and accounting discretion while the relationship between accounting 
discretion resulting from recent variables and stock return does not point to the opportunism of the 
directors. In general, the results indicated that there is no significant difference between predicted 
accounting discretion and projected future stock returns which indicate that there is mismanagement 
in creating opportunities among the firms under study.  
Keywords: firm size, firm’s growth opportunity, accounting discretion, stock return, 
management opportunism 
 
Introduction 
Todays, the story of bankrupt firms such as Enron and WorldCom due to some accounting 
irregularities has created a negative feeling among shareholders and publics that management 
opportunism is unavoidable. According to “opportunistic behavior” theory, company’s directors 
interfere with the process of calculating earnings to achieve special functions and maintain their 
interest (Rahmani, 2009). Freedoms of action, distinct procedures, flexibility in accounting 
standards and explaining and enjoying these procedures have raised concern about the agency 
problem in the society. Therefore, these abilities in accounting discretion  enable the directors of 
enterprises to take advantage of accounting discretion to apply their own judgment in conducting, 
recording and classifying financial transactions and eventually, preparing financial statements. 
However, the use of earning management is in the best interest of shareholders (Jiraporn et al., 
2008). Incentive pay to directors as well as accounting discretion enhances the sensitivity and 
reaction of stock return towards their reports so that earnings management may increase director’s 
current period payoff. It is noteworthy that when having a better reputation dominates the benefit of 
increasing the current period payoff, the director does less earnings management since concern 
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about integrity and trustworthiness in earning manipulation may raise cost and therefore, moderate 
earnings management (Pinheiro, 2013).  The above ambiguity is one of the long-term challenges and 
issues in positive accounting (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). The 
purposeful intervention by management in the earnings determination process is affected by various 
factors, some of which rooted in the prevailing economic conditions governing the firm. Regarding 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), capabilities of accounting discretion enable 
directors to transfer and report earnings among various financial periods to report desirable and 
purposeful earnings using accounting adjustments ( Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The empirical 
evidence indicates that real earnings management activities around certain financial events are of 
great importance (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Regarding the importance of adhering to professional 
and ethical issues in some societies and cultural and economical distinctions, one may expect that 
directors employ accounting discretion more efficiently through maximizing shareholder value in 
long-term period and creating value for shareholders. Directors whose incentives are consistent with 
those of owners are more likely to make accounting decisions to transfer private information (Fields 
et al., 2001). Generally speaking, the goal of this study is to present a model to clarify the role of 
firm size and growth opportunity on using accounting discretion. Eventually, the effect of this model 
on management future performance is examined to test the degree of alignment and non-alignment 
between directors and shareholders. Bowen et al. (2008) studied the vulnerability of accounting 
discretion to economic pressure on directors and its effect on firm value to identify the opportunism 
and contract efficiency. By the way, the social, economic and cultural distinctions between Iranian 
directors and foreign directors result in different findings (Namazi and Shamsoldinii, 2007).  
This study follows two general objectives. First, it seeks to determine the relationship 
between firm size and opportunity growth and accounting discretion and then it intends to determine 
the relationship between accounting discretion resulting from firm size and growth opportunity and 
stock return to reveal whether directors tend to follow opportunism or try for contract efficiency and 
management performance in their own professional ethics framework. 
 
Theoretical framework and review of literature 
Directors pay a lot of attention to the possible content of information accounting and its 
effects on users and society prior to its publication. Firm’s situation has different effects on the 
sensitivity of directors towards accounting numbers reported. Skinner and Sloan (2002) believe that 
market may extremely penalize growth firms due to the negative earnings surprise. Thus, growth 
firms are strongly motivated to confront earnings benchmarks to avoid increasing capital cost or 
maintain access to capital. Additionally, growth firms are interested in earning smoothing through 
accruals since earnings volatility may increase the examined firm risk (Beaver et al., 1970). This 
may have negative effects on the necessary capital cost for financing new projects (Minton and 
Schrand, 1999). Meanwhile, directors of non-growth firms require less cash for financing new 
projects and consequently, they are more independent. Accordingly, a positive relationship is 
expected between firm’s growth opportunity and accounting discretion. Fama and French firstly 
introduced book-to-market value ratio as one of the factors affecting stock success. They indicated 
that this ratio can explain deviations of stock return (Fama and French, 1993). This study also enjoys 
book-to-market value ratio as a growth index. 
Firm size is another economic factor affecting directors’ decisions on the way of using 
accounting discretion. Empirical evidence indicates that firm size is capable of explaining measured 
earnings management through accruals (Lusi and Swastika, 2013). Firm size means the amount of 
firm activities. 
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The effect of firm size on earnings management has been a controversial issue for ages 
(Kouki et al., 2011). Two different points of view are presented: first, there is a negative relationship 
between firm size and earnings management and accounting discretion. According to Lennox 
(1999), Gore et al. (2001), Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003) and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), as 
cited in Lusi and Swastika (2013), large firms with strong internal controls and highly qualified 
auditors are more famous and more capable of avoiding earnings management. The above supports 
suggest that lack of control by authorities can be apparently found in smaller firms and therefore, 
directors show more tendencies toward earning management (Abed et al., 2012). However, the 
proponents of the second point of view (Moses, 1987; Myers and Skinner, 2000; Nelson et al., 2002) 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between firm size and earning management. Larger firms 
are under the pressure of capital market and enjoy more bargaining power and show more tendency 
towards earnings management than their counterparts from small firms (Lusi and Swastika, 2013). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) suggested that larger firms face higher political costs and 
consequently, are motivated to apply accounting discretion to reduce unwanted political view. 
Shoorvarzi and Pahlevan pointed to the greater intensity of earnings smoothing in large firms than 
small firms and directors in small firms are more likely to smooth earnings (Shoorvarzi and 
Pahlevan, 2010). The larger the firm is , the more it is under the lens of politics . Microsoft 
Corporation in the United States is a good example of this case facing many problems with Legal 
Associations (Nowravesh et al., 2006). Therefore, one can expect that directors in large firms are 
under greater pressure than their counterparts in small firms to employ accounting discretion to 
escape political costs. On the other hand, opponents of this theory argue that larger firms are 
exposed to more public safety and are less motivated to smooth and use accounting discretion due to 
being under the focus of most financial analysts and environmental impact (Moses, 1978). 
The most controversial issue about accounting discretion is its usefulness and uselessness for 
firms’ owners. Earnings management is likely to be in tune with shareholders’ interests (Jiraporn et 
al., 2008) or to present a favorable and purposeful earnings report by directors (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). Most of the studies have found that the way in which accounting discretion is applied 
depends on the status of corporate governance and accounting discretion resulted from corporate 
governance variables are believed to stimulate management opportunism (Hssas Yegane and 
Yazdanian, 2007; Moradzadeh fard et al., 2009; Aghayi and Chalaki, 2009; Liu And Lu, 2007, Ali 
shah et al., 2009; Chung et al., 2002; Menon and Williams, 2004). One cannot immediately judge on 
directors’ opportunism unless it results in a weak performance (Bowen et al., 2008). In the second 
step, it is assumed that directors use accounting discretion to improve firm performance. Therefore, 
a positive relationship is expected between expected accounting discretion and stock return 
 
Research hypotheses 
To achieve the goals of the study, the following hypotheses are suggested: 
Hypothesis 1: there is a positive relationship between firm’s growth opportunity and 
accounting discretion 
Hypothesis 2: there is a positive relationship between firm size and accounting discretion. 
Hypothesis 3 (lack of director’s opportunism is assumed): there is a positive relationship 
between expected accounting discretion resulted from firm size and growth opportunity and stock 
return. 
 
Methodology 
The data are collected from the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Firms with the 
following conditions are included in the study and those without these conditions are randomly 
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excluded. According to Tehran Stock Exchange Web Site, 445 firms are listed in this exchange. 155 
of these firms listed between 2002 and 2012 are excluded from the study. 13 firms are excluded due 
to investment activities and 84 firms are also discarded because of discrepancy in reporting date and 
non-compliance with fiscal year ended 12/29 to remove seasonal effects and increase the 
comparability of information. Finally, 68 firms are also omitted due to the lack of access to some 
examined data. Therefore, our population is eventually reduced to 125 firms. 
To collect data, library method is employed and audited financial statements of the firms 
such as Rahavard-e Novin’s database and some famous websites, i.e. development research 
management and Islamic studies founded by Stock Exchange are also used to gather data necessary 
for research variables. Since the research method is correlational and ex post facto, Regression 
Analysis is used to determine the relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
 
Research variables and measuring them 
The flexibility of the accounting rules and procedures implies the concept of accounting 
discretion allowing earning management in the firms. Adopting Bowen et al. and his colleagues’ 
work, accounting discretion index is calculated through combining earning smoothing measure and 
abnormal accruals absolute value. To calculate the abnormal accruals, adjusted-Jones model is used 
as follow: 
1 2
1 1 1
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t t t
t t t
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To test the third hypothesis, the general index of expected accounting discretion, i.e 
determining the degree of the effect of firm size and growth opportunity on accounting discretion, 
the model derived in the first stage is employed. The expected number is used as an independent 
variable in the following stage. 
 
Operational definitions for variables 
growth opportunity (GO) = firm’s book value ÷ firm’s market value 
firm size (FS) = Log(sales) 
performance (return on assets) =  earnings before extraordinary items ÷ Total 
assets 
abnormal accruals absolute value(AAAV) =|total accruals - normal accruals| 
earnings smoothing measure(ESM) = SD of operation cash flow ÷ SD of earnings 
Accounting discretion index (ADI)= (AAAV rate + ESM rate) ÷ 2 
ݏݐ݋ܿ݇	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ൌ ሾሺ݌ଵି݌଴ሻ ൅ ܦܲܵ ൅ ܤ݂݁݊݁݅ݐݏ ܱݐ݄݁ݎሿ݌଴  
 
The mathematical pattern of the examined variables are as follow: 
 
Accounting Discretion = β଴+ βଵGrowth Opportunity +βଶ Firm’s Size + βଷ Firm’s 
Performance + βସIndustry + βହTime + e 
Future Stock Return = β଴+ βଵPredicted Excess Accounting Discretion +βଶ Stock Return + βଷ 
Ln Sales + e 
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The conceptual model of the examined variables is presented as figure 1: 
 
 
Figure1: The conceptual model of the study 
 
Findings 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics including Mean, Maximum, Minimum and 
Standard Deviation of the research variables as follow: 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of economic attributes of the firm, accounting discretion and 
future stock return 
Variable Symbol Min Max M SD 
Growth opportunity GO -3.6 15.4 -0.42595 0.903997 
Firm size FS 1 45,039 1,025 4,073 
performance P -0.31 0.62 0.13368 0.129896 
Abnormal Accruals Absolute 
Value 
AAAV -3.91 0.31 -2.48885 0.723827 
Earning Smoothing Measure ESM -3.91 3.04 0.75808 1.101569 
Accounting discretion Index ADI 0.036 0.968 0.503984 0.2004 
Future Stock Return FSR -67.25 351.47 12.41 54.91 
Future Stock Return Average AFSR -42.89 156.03 17.13 31.77 
 
 The minimum and maximum value of growth opportunity of the firms (market-to-book 
negative value ratio) is between -3.60 and 15.40.  The positive maximum number is for Plascokar 
company in the first and second period with negative book ratio. The rest of the firms are between -
3.60 and 0. For growth opportunity index, the mean is equal to -0.43. The value of this index is 
exactly the same as the opportunity index presented in Bown et al. (0.439). The minimum and 
maximum value of the firm size (sale logarithm) is between 1 billion rials and 45 billion Rials. It is 
also noteworthy that the maximum and minimum value of the firm performance (ROA) is between -
Independent 
variable 
performance firm size growth opportunity 
Accounting 
discretion index 
Future  
Stock  
Return  
 Predicted excess 
Accounting 
discretion   
Average 
Ranking 
ESM 
AAAV 
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31% and +62%. Averagely, the studied firms performance indicates +13% positive return. Firm 
Stock Return is distributed from -67% to +351%. The mean of firms stock return is + 12.41% and 
mean of firms stock return for their next three years is +17.13%. However, stock return is 25% in 
Bowen et al. and his colleagues. 
 
Testing research hypotheses 
Table 2 presents the results of testing the relationships between firm size and growth 
opportunity and accounting discretion. 
 
Table 2.  Results of the model of the relationship between  firm size and growth opportunity 
and accounting discretion 
Model R R-sq Adj- R-sq D-W F Sig 
ADI 0.452 0.204 0.2 1.39 47.76 0.000 
AAAV 0.447 0.200 0.196 1.56 46.53 0.000 
ESM 0.28 0.078 0.073 1.65 15.77 0.000 
 
F- test is used to examine the significance of the regression model. According to the result of 
F-test and 0.000 level of significance, one may conclude that regression model is significant at 99% 
level of significance for accounting discretion and its components. The value of Adj-R^2 for 
abnormal accruals absolute value, standard model of earning smoothing and general model of 
accounting discretion reveals that 19.6%, 7.3% and 20% of changes in dependent variables are 
explained by independent variable. The value of D-W test in absolute value of abnormal accruals 
model and standard model of earning smoothing is between 1.5 and 2.5 indicating lack of 
correlation between errors. However, the value of D-W test for general model of accounting 
discretion is less than 1.5 pointing to a relative independence. The value of VIF in regression model 
suggests that all variables of the study in all models are distributed between 1 and 1.5 showing lack 
of multicollinearity in regression and appropriate estimate of coefficients in regression.  
Table 3 uses multivariate regression model to examine the relationship between firm size and 
growth opportunity and accounting discretion. Accordingly, the level of significance for firm growth 
opportunity is smaller than level of error (sig < 0.01). Therefore, H0 is rejected. However, a negative 
coefficient was found for this variable pointing to a negatively significant relationship between firm 
growth opportunity and accounting discretion, i.e. as firm growth opportunity increases, accounting 
discretion decreases. Thus, the research hypothesis is accepted at 99% level of significance and a 
negative relationship was found between firm growth opportunity and accounting discretion. 
 
Table 3. The result of fitting regression of the model of firm size and growth opportunity with 
accounting discretion index 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable-ADI 
B Beta T Sig. H1 part sign 
Constant -519.69 - -7.03 0.000 accepted 0.00 - 
GO -11.43 -0.13 -2.84 0.005 accepted -0.13 negative 
Firm size 26.65 0.44 9.54 0.000 accepted 0.44 positive 
P - -0.06 -1.31 0.192 rejected - No relationship 
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  Table 3 also indicates that level of significance for firm size is smaller than error level 
(Sig<0.01) and H0 is rejected. This positive coefficient suggests a positively significant relationship 
between firm size and accounting discretion, i.e. firms with large size use accounting discretion 
more than others. Therefore, the research hypothesis is approved at 99% level of significance and 
there is a positive relationship between firm size and accounting discretion. 
In Table 3, correlations-part indicates the effect of a particular variable on dependent 
variable and firm size has the most effect on accounting discretion. 
Adopting STATA software and random-effects GLS regression model, the effect of two 
virtual variables of time and type of industry in the firm size and growth opportunity model and 
accounting discretion is presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4. The result of fitting regression of the model of firm size and growth opportunity with 
accounting discretion index with control of time and type of industry 
ADI Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
GO -2.4206 1.2313 -1.97 0.049 
FS 5.86581 0.9120 6.43 0.000 
P 2.64316 12.0760 0.22 0.827 
time1 1.40994 2.3245 0.61 0.544 
time2 0.60194 2.2734 0.26 0.791 
time3 0 removed     
Cons -95.992 24.0770 -3.99 0.000 
 
 (P>|z|) reveals that the level of significance for time and type of industry, except industry 4, 
(automobile industry) is bigger than 5% and thus, time and type of industry have no effect on 
accounting discretion. The level of significance for type of industry is not shown due to 
summarizing the results.  
  Table 5 shows that level of significance for firm size is smaller than error level (Sig<0.01) 
and H0 is rejected. This positive coefficient suggests a positively significant relationship between 
firm size and Abnormal Accruals Absolute Value. However, level of significance for growth 
opportunity is smaller than error level (Sig>0.05) and H0 is accepted. Therefore, a significant 
relationship was found between firm size and abnormal accruals absolute value. Of course, growth 
opportunity shows significant relationship at 90% level of significance. 
 
Table 5. The result of fitting regression of the model of firm size and growth opportunity with 
abnormal accruals absolute value 
Independent variables Dependent variable-AAAV 
B Beta T Sig. H1 part sign 
Constant 9.18 - 5.82 0.000 Accepted 0.00 - 
GO - -0.09 -1.90 0.058 Rejected - No 
relationship 
FS 0.55 0.43 9.10 0.000 Accepted 0.42 positive 
P 1.22 0.09 2.02 0.044 Accepted 0.09 positive 
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In Table 6, level of significance for firm size is smaller than error level (Sig<0.01) and H0 is 
rejected at 99% level of significance. As expected in the hypothesis, the coefficient of the firm size 
is positive. Eventually, level of significance for growth opportunity is bigger than error level 
(Sig>0.05) and H0 is accepted. Therefore, a significant relationship was not found between firm 
growth opportunity and earnings smoothing measure. 
 
Table 6. The result of fitting regression of the model of firm size and growth opportunity with 
earning smoothing measure 
Independent variables Dependent variable-ESM 
B Beta T Sig. H1 part sign 
Constant -4.33 - -3.89 0.000 accepted 0.00 - 
GO - -0.08 -1.61 0.109 rejected - No 
relationship 
FS 0.20 0.24 4.73 0.000 accepted 0.24 positive 
P -1.53 -0.18 -3.60 0.000 accepted -0.18 negative 
 
According to the second hypothesis, due to the firm size and growth opportunity, a 
significant relationship is expected between expected accounting discretion and firm’s stock return. 
 
Table 7. The result of fitting regression of the model of expected accounting discretion and 
stock return 
Independent and control variable symbols Future stock return 
Short-term Mid-term 
Sig H1 Sig H1 
Constant Cons 0 - 0 - 
Expected accounting discretion PEADI 0.579 rejected 0.945 rejected 
Sale logarithm lnsale 0.878 rejected 0.269 rejected 
Stock return SR 0.471 rejected 0.000 Accepted
Correlation coefficient R 0.048 0.601 
Coefficient of determination R-sq 0.002 0.361 
Adjusted Coefficient of determination Adj- R-sq -0.006 0.360 
Durbin-Watson D-W 2.118 1.932 
F-statistic F 0.29 211.132 
Level of sig Sig. 0.833 0.000 
 
According to the F-statistic and level of significance for future stock return, one may 
conclude that there is no significant relationship between expected accounting discretion and firm’s 
stock return at 95% level of significance in the short-term and mid-term horizon. However, the 
regression model is accepted in the mid-term horizon at sig. <0.00 due to the significant relationship 
between average stock return and average future stock return. Therefore, there is no significant 
relationship between expected accounting discretion related to firm size and growth opportunity and 
firm’s stock return  
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Results and discussion 
Adopting three measurement indices (accounting discretion index, Abnormal Accruals 
Absolute Value Index and earning smoothing index), the results of the study indicate that there is a 
positively significant relationship between firm size and degree of using accounting discretion at 
99% level of significance. Therefore, one can expect that directors in large firms are under greater 
pressure than their counterparts in small firms to employ accounting discretion to a great extent to 
escape political costs. The findings of the study are in tune with the argument offered by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) according to which, larger firms are unintentionally motivated to apply 
accounting discretion to reduce political view. Also, Shoorvarzi and Pahlevan pointed to the greater 
intensity of earnings smoothing  in large firms than small firms and said that mangers in small firms 
are more likely to smooth earnings (Shoorvarzi and Pahlevan, 2010). This finding confront neither 
to that of Lusi and Swastika (2013), in which a negatively significant relationship was found and nor 
to that of Moses (1987), based on which larger firms are less motivated to smooth earnings due to 
their fame in analysts’ view. The results of the present study do not conform to an opinion, 
according to which large firms with strong internal controls and highly qualified auditors are very 
famous and do less earning management. 
Growth opportunity has significant relationship with accounting discretion index at 99% 
level of significance. However, it has negatively significant relationship with abnormal accruals 
absolute value at 90% level of significance. Firms with high growth opportunity do less 
manipulation in accounting items. Firms with higher growth opportunity use less accounting 
discretion. This evidence does not conform to the argument made by Beaver et al. (1970) and 
theoretical principles of earning management, based on which growth firms are highly motivated for 
earning smoothing through accruals.  
The question raised here is whether directors look for opportunism during using accounting 
discretion or not. The findings of the study do not show any evidence on management opportunism. 
Accounting discretion resulted from firm size and growth opportunity has no negative effects on 
firm’s stock return as determinant of future management performance. Due to adhering to 
professional and cultural ethics, therefore, directors do not look for opportunism and try to improve 
contract efficiency. 
According to the findings of research suggesting a significant relationship between firm size 
and growth opportunity index and accounting discretion, institutions, organizations, regulatory 
agencies and supervisory companies such as auditing firm, Stock Exchange and accounting body are 
required to pay more attention to economic characteristics of the firm (firm size and growth 
opportunity index) during formulation and adoption of standards and regulations monitoring the 
directors’ behavior in using accounting discretion. Financial analysts and capital actors are also 
suggested to consider economic characteristics of the firm during analyzing and making decision on 
the degree of using accounting discretion. To do further research, the following issues are suggested: 
First, the relationship between firm size and growth opportunity and accounting discretion 
and its effect on return indices of the firm including return on assets, return on owner’s equity and 
return on invested capital. 
Second, the relationship between firm size and growth opportunity and accounting 
discretion, and its effect on the economic indices such as economic value added, market value 
added, etc. 
Third. the relationship between other economic characteristics including risk, cash situation, 
etc. with accounting discretion. 
Finally, the relationship between macroeconomic variables such as inflation, guaranteed 
interest rate, etc. and accounting discretion. 
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Conclusion 
The result of this study shows that there was a significant positive relationship between firm 
size and accounting discretion. The larger the company, the more the amount of discretionary 
accounting application. In fact, larger firms, in comparison to smaller ones, have played more 
significant role in the application of discretionary accruals and income smoothing and in general, in 
the application of accounting discretion. Regarding the second hypothesis, the results indicated that 
there was a significant negative relationship between growth opportunities with accounting 
discretion index. Firms with higher growth opportunities, in comparison to firms with low growth 
opportunities, have used accounting discretion in a smaller scale. Increased levels of growth 
opportunities among the firms have not increased  accounting discretion practices while it has 
limited it . Regarding the last hypothesis, the results indicated that the managers have not made use 
of the opportunities although there was an increase in the amount of using accounting discretion 
with a change in firm size and growth opportunity.   
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